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Abstract Using the techniques of revealed preference analysis, we study a
two-stage model of choice behavior. In the first stage, the decision maker
maximizes a menu-dependent binary relation encoding preferences that are
imperfectly perceived. In the second, a menu-independent binary relation is
maximized over the subset of alternatives that survive the first stage. This
structure can support various interpretations, including those of salience ef-
fects, positive action, and surface characteristics. We characterize the model
behaviorally both in ordinal form and in terms of the corresponding numerical
representations.
1 Introduction
1.1 The secondary criterion
This paper uses the techniques of revealed preference analysis to study a two-
stage model of choice behavior. In the first stage, the decision maker (hence-
forth “DM”) maximizes a menu-dependent binary relation encoding prefer-
ences that are imperfectly perceived due to cognitive or information-processing
constraints. As detailed in [35], this mechanism leads to a form of satisficing in
the sense of Simon [32].1 In the second stage of the model, a menu-independent
binary relation (termed the “secondary criterion”) is maximized over the sub-
set of alternatives that survive the first stage.
At the formal level, adding a second stage to the basic satisficing model
changes the implied constraints on behavior, and our main result will identify
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1 Satisficing has been defined by Reber et al. [21, p. 701] as “accept[ing] a choice or
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these constraints. At the level of interpretation, the secondary criterion can
be used to capture a variety of additional factors that may influence the DM’s
choices. For example:
– Salience effects. After the DM has used his deliberative resources to identify
a subset of alternatives as good, if not necessarily the best, attention effects
may influence his final selection from among these options that pass the
satisficing threshold.2 Here the secondary relation would be interpreted as
a measure of salience—the property of standing out from the rest.3
– Positive action. Legal frameworks that prohibit most employment discrimi-
nation may nevertheless permit or even mandate “positive action” aimed at
increasing participation by groups deemed to be disadvantaged for histor-
ical or other reasons.4 Importantly, such positive discrimination is allowed
only if the individual to be given favorable treatment is “as qualified as”
other candidates. In a maximization setting, the latter proviso means that
action can be taken only to break indifference between candidates who are
exactly equally qualified. But if the employer engages in satisficing at the
merit-evaluation (i.e., first) stage, there is more room left for group-identity
(i.e., second-stage) criteria to influence employment outcomes.
– Surface characteristics. In many situations the DM cares about two dis-
tinct aspects of the choice problem, one of which is more important than
the other but at the same time requires more effort to rank the alternatives.
For instance, in the choice of a new car a frequent commuter may value
reliability more than appearance. But appearance is a surface character-
istic, while reliability is to some extent hidden. Hence the DM may seek
to identify a subset of cars that are “reliable enough” (without ranking
the options extremely precisely on this dimension), and may then simply
choose the most visually attractive car from within this set.5
2 Attention is a core topic in cognitive psychology; see, e.g., Anderson [1, pp. 72–105]. In
the context of salience effects it is understood that we refer to attention allocated involun-
tarily, rather than consciously.
3 Combining satisficing and salience effects is natural in that both are responses to the
same problem: Human cognitive capabilities are limited, while the environment in which
choices are made can be highly complex. Satisficing deals with this problem by allowing a
margin of error in the attempt to find an optimal alternative. Salience, meanwhile, focuses
attention on aspects of the environment that we are predisposed to find interesting or en-
ticing. The present framework provides a model of how these two coping mechanisms could
interact.
4 Positive (or “affirmative”) action legislation specifies certain “protected characteristics,”
such as age, disability, marital status, pregnancy and maternity, race and national origin, sex
and sexual orientation; which by law may not normally play a role in employment decisions.
If a group is considered to suffer a disadvantage related to one of these characteristics, then
an employer may (according to the U.K. Equality Act 2010, Part 11, Chapter 2) “[treat]
a person (A) more favourably in connection with recruitment or promotion than another
person (B) because A has the protected characteristic but B does not.”
5 Similarly, a reader selecting a novel to take on an extended beach vacation may value
literary merit (a hidden characteristic) more than the number of pages (a surface character-
istic), and a voter may care more about candidates’ policy preferences (hidden) than about
their party affiliations (surface).
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Our goal is to develop an abstract model that encompasses these and similar
phenomena within the framework of axiomatic choice theory.
The combination of hidden characteristics at the initial stage and surface
characteristics at the second stage is at the core of our model, and applies also
to the first two interpretations above. In the case of salience effects, the hidden
criterion is the DM’s utility (i.e., his maximand in the absence of cognitive
constraints) while the surface criterion is the ability of the alternatives to
attract attention. In the case of positive action, the hidden criterion is the
employee’s merit while the surface criterion is his degree of membership in
the favored group. Note that for our model to be suitable these criteria must
be applied lexicographically, since allowing for tradeoffs would lead to quite
different forms of behavior.6
Since the interpretation of the model is not fixed, some important concep-
tual questions cannot be answered until we commit to a particular viewpoint.
For example, the DM’s welfare could be measured by the primary criterion
alone (as in the case of salience effects when salience per se is not valued)
or by the lexicographic composition of the primary and second criteria (as in
the case of surface characteristics such as the visual attractiveness of cars).
Other issues that hinge on interpretation include whether or not the second-
stage maximization should be thought of as a deliberate action by the DM—
arguably so under the positive action interpretation but not under the salience
effects interpretation—and the conceptual relationship of our theory to other
models of choice.7
1.2 Components of the model
To see how our model works, imagine a setting where alternatives are drawn
from the set X = xyz.8 (A more elaborate four-alternative example appears
below in Figure 1.) The DM will have two complete and transitive relations
over X, namely a primary relation R1 and a secondary relation R2; and the
symmetric and asymmetric parts of each Rk will be denoted by Ik and Pk, re-
spectively. For example, the primary and secondary rankings could be xP1yP1z
(implying xP1z) and zI2yP2x (implying zP2x).
In the absence of cognitive constraints, the DM would optimize R1 at the
first stage and then R2 at the second stage, amounting to a procedure of lexi-
cographic preference maximization. Indeed, this is precisely how our DM will
behave when faced with “binary” choice problems containing just two alter-
natives. For instance, when facing the menu xy, a DM with the two relations
6 In connection with the lexicographic nature of the model, see Manzini and Mariotti’s [14,
p. 1825] discussion of “sequential noncompensatory heuristics” and the associated psychol-
ogy literature.
7 For further discussion of these points, see Section 3 regarding welfare analysis and Sec-
tion 4 regarding the relationship to other models.
8 Note the multiplicative notation for enumerated sets, which we shall use whenever con-
venient.
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specified above will apply the strict primary preference xP1y and eliminate
alternative y from consideration, at which point the secondary relation R2 is
irrelevant. The rationale here is that binary menus are particularly simple in
terms of cognition, and so it is in these contexts that the DM’s true primary
rankings are most likely to be reflected accurately.
In larger and thus more complex problems we shall allow cognitive con-
straints to bind at the first stage. This will mean that strict primary rankings
perceived in the relevant binary problem need not be perceived when addi-
tional options are present. For instance, in problem xyz it could be that the
strict preferences xP1z and yP1z are perceived but the strict preference xP1y
is not perceived, even though the latter is perceived in the simpler problem
xy. In problem xyz the DM will then be left “pseudo-indifferent” between x
and y after the first stage (alternative z having been eliminated), and so the
secondary relation will become relevant. Indeed, since yP2x we can conclude
that x will be eliminated from consideration in the second stage and y will be
chosen (despite being R1-suboptimal).9
To keep a record of when different rankings are and are not perceived,
we shall make explicit the menu dependence of the relations R1, I1, and P1;
writing xP1xyy to indicate perception of the strict preference xP
1y in problem
xy, and writing xI1xyzy to indicate its non-perception (resulting in pseudo-
indifference) in problem xyz.10 Since by assumption cognitive constraints do
not affect the second stage, the relations R2, I2, and P2 will remain menu-
independent. When facing an arbitrary problem A, our model thus imagines
the DM maximizing a menu-dependent relation R1A and then maximizing a
menu-independent relation R2 over the alternatives that remain.
Observe that the relations R1 and R2 in our example can be represented
numerically by any utility assignments with f1(x) > f1(y) > f1(z) and f2(z) =
f2(y) > f2(x). Moreover, for problem xyz we can set the first-stage satificing
threshold θ1(xyz) equal to the lowest f1-utility assigned to an alternative in
the highest pseudo-indifference class according to R1xyz. Since the preferences
perceived here are xyP1xyzz, the highest pseudo-indifference class is the subset
xy and the threshold is θ1(xyz) = f1(y) < f1(x). Assigning thresholds in the
same way for each problem A, the DM will then be willing to choose w ∈ A if
and only if it maximizes f2(w) subject to f1(w) ≥ θ1(A).11
9 For completeness, the full mapping from choice problems to surviving alternatives in
this example is xy 7→ x, xz 7→ x, yz 7→ y, and xyz 7→ y.
10 Permitting arbitrary menu dependence at the first stage would make our theory hard to
falsify, but we shall impose additional restrictions in the form of the “nestedness” hypothesis
on perceived preferences discussed in Section 2.2 below (and in [35, pp. 54–56]).
11 Of course, the DM need not solve this constrained maximization problem consciously
or intentionally. Indeed, if the satisficing constraint results from cognitive limitations then
a literal understanding of the numerical formulation of our model is not entirely natural: In
order to check the constraint the DM would need to know f1, but then he would maximize
this function perfectly and ignore the threshold. This is why the relation R1 and the asso-
ciated f1 should be interpreted as objects that the DM would maximize in the absence of
cognitive constraints, and why the numerical representation 〈f1, θ1, f2〉 is best viewed as a
convenient analytical tool rather than as a procedural model.
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In summary, our theory has three interlinked components. Its mathemati-
cal primitive is the DM’s choice behavior, and our main result (Theorem 2.9)
will concern when this behavior possesses a certain underlying structure. In
contrast, our conceptual primitive is the ordinal model (comprising R1, P2,
R1xy, I
1
xyz, etc.) formalizing our assumptions about how choices are generated,
and it is to this model that we should turn when considering whether the the-
ory is plausible introspectively.12 Finally, the third component—which is not
in any sense primitive—is the numerical representation of the DM’s behavior
(comprising f1, θ1, and f2). This representation may be useful in applica-
tions of the theory, and a subsidiary result (Theorem 2.11) will translate our
characterization of the model into numerical terms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define
our model formally (Sections 2.1–2.2), introduce our axioms (Section 2.3),
and state our main and subsidiary characterization results (Sections 2.4–2.5).
Section 3 discusses welfare analysis, while Section 4 reviews two strands of
related work. All proofs not in the text appear in Appendix A.
2 Characterization results
2.1 Preliminaries
Fix a set X of alternatives and a domain D ⊆ {A ⊆ X : A 6= ∅} =: F. A
map C : D→ F is a choice function if ∀A ∈ D we have C(A) ⊆ A. Here each
A ∈ D is a menu and C(A) is the corresponding choice set containing the
alternatives that might be chosen from A given some cognitive hypothesis. We
shall assume that {xy : x, y ∈ X} ⊆ D, so that C associates a choice set with
each binary (or unary) menu, and also for convenience that X ∈ D. But D
will be otherwise unrestricted and need not be the full domain F.13
A (binary) relation R on X is a subset of X × X, with 〈x, y〉 ∈ R com-
monly written as xRy. Such a relation is a complete preorder if it is complete
(¬[xRy] only if yRx) and transitive (xRyRz only if xRz); a tournament if it
is complete and antisymmetric (xRyRx only if x = y); and a complete order
if it is complete, transitive, and antisymmetric.
12 Indeed, the purpose of choice-theoretic analysis is to draw logical connections between
observable behavior and hypotheses about cognition. The related point that theories of
choice cannot be based only on “internal consistency” has been made by Sen [31] and
Rubinstein and Salant [26, pp. 118–120]. Note also that it is not our goal to explain the
origin of the DM’s primary or secondary preferences, nor why these preferences are or are not
perceived in different choice problems. In particular, we do not attempt to embed preference
perception in an explicit optimization model with, for example, information-gathering or
contemplation costs (see [35, pp. 64–65]). As is typical in axiomatic choice theory, we take
cognitive structures as given and subject only to consistency or regularity assumptions.
13 The inclusion of all binary menus in D is essential for our analysis. However, this restric-
tion is weak by the standards of axiomatic choice theory, where D = F is commonly assumed
(despite exceptions such as, e.g., Bossert et al. [8]). A penetrating analysis of domain spec-
ifications in choice-theoretic models of bounded rationality is provided by de Clippel and
Rozen [10].
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Notation 2.1. Write G(A,R) := {x ∈ A : ∀y ∈ A, xRy}.
Recall that classical choice theory (see, e.g., Samuelson [28] and Arrow [3])
imagines the DM’s behavior to be determined entirely by his or her preferences
among alternatives. Writing xR1y when x is considered at least as good as y
(“weak preference”), xP1y when xR1y and ¬[yR1x] (“strict preference”), and
xI1y when xR1yR1x (“indifference”), this hypothesis becomes the requirement
that ∀A ∈ D we have C(A) = G(A,R1), expressed more compactly as C =
G(·,R1). When R1 is a complete preorder, C then simply selects from each
menu the highest I1-equivalence class of alternatives according to P1.
2.2 Relation systems and nestedness
The model of decision making studied here differs from the classical model in
two respects. Firstly, primary preference maximization is imperfect, and may
become increasingly so as the menu becomes more complex. And secondly,
the initial satisficing stage is followed by maximization of an independent
secondary relation. We proceed now to develop the first-stage structure, before
turning in Sections 2.3–2.4 to the characterization of the full composite model.
In our formulation, satisficing is represented cognitively as menu depen-
dence of the “perceived preferences” guiding choice behavior. That is to say,
for each A ∈ D we have a separate relation R1A, with associated P1A and I1A,
that incorporates both the DM’s true primary preferences over A (encoded
in R1) and the resolution at which these preferences are perceived. Assem-
bling the menu-specific relations into a vector then yields the DM’s “primary
preference system” R1, a type of construct that we now define more formally.
Definition 2.2. A. A relation system R = 〈RA〉A∈D on D is a vector of
relations on the menus in D. B. A system of complete preorders is a relation
system each component of which is a complete preorder.
To require that the primary preference system R1 be made up of com-
plete preorders is to assume that while its components may be incomplete
in the sense of reflecting the DM’s true preferences only coarsely, each R1A
must be both complete and transitive in the relation-theoretic sense. It follows
that menu A is partitioned into well-defined “pseudo-indifference” (i.e., I1A-
equivalence) classes, and maximization of perceived preferences then amounts
to selecting the highest such class according to P1A.
14
Notation 2.3. Write G(A,R) := G(A,RA) = {x ∈ A : ∀y ∈ A, xRAy}.
14 As emphasized by the associate editor, the complete preorder assumption on perceived
preferences is debatable for a DM with cognitive limitations. In particular, cognitive con-
straints could plausibly be manifested as incompleteness of R1A or intransitivity of I
1
A. For
the first stage of our model in isolation, this issue has been considered in [35, pp. 60–61],
where characterization results are given for perceived preferences with less stringent ordering
properties. Determining which of these results can be extended to two stages is, however,
beyond the scope of the present paper. Here our starting point is the (one-stage) satisficing
model in [35], for which the full complement of standard ordering properties is needed.
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In addition to the intramenu ordering requirement in Definition 2.2B, we
shall impose the following pair of intermenu consistency properties on the
primary preference system.
Definition 2.4. A. A relation system R is nested if ∀x, y ∈ A,B ∈ D such
that A ⊆ B we have xPBy only if xPAy. B. A relation system R is binary
transitive if ∀x, y, z ∈ X we have xRxyyRyzz only if xRxzz.
Nestedness captures an assumption that the DM can discriminate among
alternatives at least as precisely when the menu on which they appear is
smaller. Since the default relationship between any two alternatives is pseudo-
indifference, it is the agent’s strict preferences that his cognitive faculties seek
to uncover. Given x, y ∈ A ⊆ B, we posit that if the strict preference xP1y
is perceived in the context of problem B, written xP1By, then this same strict
preference should also be perceived in the context of the (weakly) simpler prob-
lem A, written xP1Ay.
15 This is equivalent (when R1 is a system of complete
preorders) to yR1Ax =⇒ yR1Bx, but does not guarantee the converse.16
The second intermenu consistency property concerns “binary” choice prob-
lems with either one or two alternatives. Intuitively, our assumption is that
the DM fully perceives his primary preferences when facing these very simple
menus. That is to say, we have xP1xyy ⇐⇒ xP1y, or equivalently yR1xyx ⇐⇒
yR1x. Of course, we also assume that the true primary relation R1 is a com-
plete preorder, and in particular that it is transitive. Since true and binary
perceived preferences are identical, this amounts to the binary transitivity
property xR1xyyR
1
yzz =⇒ xR1xzz in Definition 2.4B.
For x, y ∈ A, note that xP1Ay =⇒ xP1xyy ⇐⇒ xP1y, where the first impli-
cation follows from nestedness. This means that a strict preference perceived
in any choice problem is always genuine, in the sense that it would be affirmed
by the DM if he were cognitively unconstrained. In contrast xR1Ay does not in
general ensure that xR1y, so weak perceived preferences need not be genuine.
For this reason we refer to the assertion xR1Ay as a “pseudo-preference,” just




Ax) is a statement of “pseudo-indifference.”
17
In summary, the first stage of our model describes a DM possessing true
primary preferences of the classical sort; who perceives these preferences fully
in binary problems but (perhaps) imperfectly in larger ones; whose perceived
preferences partition each menu into well-defined pseudo-indifference classes;
and who perceives a strict preference in a given problem only if he also per-
ceives it in each smaller problem in which it is relevant.
15 The implicit assumption that the relative complexity of two menus is aligned with set
inclusion is discussed at length in [35, pp. 54–56].
16 The intuition for nestedness can be understood in terms of an analogy (suggested by
Robert Wilson) to either mapmaking or telescopic vision. The larger the area one wishes
to depict on one’s map or view through one’s telescope, the lower will be the resolution of
the resulting image. Zooming in on a particular region—analogous to removing alternatives
from a menu—will improve the level of detail but at the cost of narrower scope.
17 Here the asymmetry between strict and weak perceived preference results from pseudo-
indifference being the default relationship between options, which can be overturned by the
DM’s cognitive efforts.
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2.3 Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity
When maximization of the secondary relation R2 is appended to the first-stage
model described above, the choice set for a given A ∈ D is determined as
C(A) = G(G(A,R1),R2). (1)
Our task is to characterize this model behaviorally for the case of R2 a complete
preorder and R1 a nested, binary transitive system of complete preorders.
To achieve the desired characterization, we shall need methods of deducing
from raw choice data sufficient information about R1 and R2, both assumed
to be unobserved.18 The first type of information is contained in the following
pair of revealed relation systems, which for a given menu B conduct a “local”
(relative to B) search of the domain for direct or indirect evidence of a primary
pseudo-preference.
Definition 2.5. Define the relation systems R̂1d and R̂1i as follows. For
x, y ∈ B ∈ D: A. Let xR̂1dB y if ∃A ∈ D such that both y ∈ A ⊆ B





B · · · R̂1dB zn = y.
The assertion xR̂1dB y means that x is choosable in the presence of y in at
least one problem A ⊆ B. This implies that xR1Ay (since otherwise x would





B · · · R̂1dB zn = y implies x = z1R1Bz2R1B · · ·R1Bzn = y, where-
upon xR1By since R
1
B is transitive. We conclude that either xR̂
1d
B y or xR̂
1i
By
is valid evidence that xR1By, and it is worth noting that this remains true
regardless of what occurs later in the decision-making process.
Next we deduce secondary preferences from the choice data, collecting this
information in menu-independent binary relations and conducting a “global”
search of the domain.
Definition 2.6. Define the relations R̂2d and R̂2i as follows. For x, y ∈ X: A.
Let xR̂2dy if ∃A ∈ D such that yR̂1iAx and x ∈ C(A). B. Let xR̂2iy if ∃n ≥ 2
and z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that x = z1R̂2dz2R̂2d · · · R̂2dzn = y.
The assertion xR̂2dy means that x is choosable in the presence of y in at
least one problem A for which yR̂1iAx. Since the latter implies that yR
1
Ax and
since x is not eliminated in the first stage, for each z ∈ A we have yR1AxR1Az
and thus yR1Az since R
1
A is transitive. It follows that y too survives the first
stage, and since x is choosable we can conclude that xR2y. In short, we have
that xR̂2dy implies xR2y. But then x = z1R̂
2dz2R̂
2d · · · R̂2dzn = y implies x =
z1R
2z2R
2 · · ·R2zn = y, whereupon xR2y since R2 is transitive. We conclude
that either xR̂2dy or xR̂2iy is valid evidence that xR2y.
18 In some applications the secondary criterion may be observed or otherwise known to
the modeler, in which case information about this relation no longer needs to be inferred
from choice behavior. For example, R2 may reflect the relative salience of the alternatives as
determined by observable advertising. Such scenarios lead to a different revealed preference
exercise, of the sort studied by Manzini et al. [16].
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We shall use Definitions 2.5–2.6 to state the first of two axioms needed to
characterize our model. Given x, y ∈ A, let x ∈ C(A) and yR̂1iAx, so that y
survives the first stage (as shown above). If also yR̂2ix then we know that yR2x
(again as shown above), and since x survives the second stage it follows that
y ∈ G(G(A,R1),R2) = C(A). The following property of the choice function is
therefore a necessary condition for the model.
Condition 2.7 (Weak Congruence). Given x, y ∈ A ∈ D, if x ∈ C(A), yR̂1iAx,
and yR̂2ix, then y ∈ C(A).
In words, Weak Congruence states that if alternative x is choosable and al-
ternative y is revealed to be (perceived to be) at least as good as x at both
stages of the model, then y too must be choosable.19
The second axiom we shall employ imposes transitivity on the DM’s binary
choices.
Condition 2.8 (Base Transitivity). Given x, y, z ∈ X, if x ∈ C(xy) and
y ∈ C(yz) then x ∈ C(xz).
In binary problems the DM applies the true first-stage relation R1 (since true
and binary perceived preferences are identical), followed by the secondary
relation R2. Furthermore, since both of these relations are complete preorders,
their lexicographic composition (see Definition 3.1) will inherit this property,
and thus choices must satisfy Base Transitivity.
2.4 Ordinal characterization
Our main characterization result states that Weak Congruence and Base Tran-
sitivity together are necessary and sufficient for the two-stage model under
investigation.
Theorem 2.9. There exist a nested, binary transitive system of complete
preorders R1 and a complete preorder R2 such that C = G(G(·,R1),R2) if
and only if Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity hold.
As usual, moving from the cognitive model to the axioms is the more
straightforward exercise. Indeed, we have already seen rough arguments for
the necessity of Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity when choices are
generated as in Equation 1. Conversely, the heart of the proof of Theorem 2.9
lies in showing that C = G(G(·, R̂1i), R̂2i); i.e., that the indirect revealed
19 The name “Weak Congruence” refers to Richter’s [23, p. 637] classical Congruence ax-
iom, which can be stated as follows: Given x, y ∈ A ∈ D, if x ∈ C(A) and yR̂1iXx, then
y ∈ C(A). The conclusion of this implication is retained in Condition 2.7 while the hypothe-
ses are strengthened—thereby weakening its logical force—in two distinct ways. First, the
stage-one hypothesis yR̂1iAx replaces yR̂
1i
Xx, so that the revealed preference must be found
within menu A. And second, the stage-two hypothesis yR̂2ix is added.
Note also that, while weaker than Congruence, Weak Congruence continues to imply
Sen’s [29, p. 384] so-called “β” condition: Given x, y ∈ A,B ∈ D, if A ⊆ B, x, y ∈ C(A),
and y ∈ C(B), then x ∈ C(B).














































Fig. 1 A choice function satisfying the conditions in Theorem 2.9. The first entry in each
cell shows the subset of choosable options, and the second and third entries show the relevant
ranking information for the two stages of the model. Here the DM’s primary and secondary
rankings are zP1yP1xP1w and xP2wP2yI2z. Moreover, the assertion zP1xyzy means that
the strict primary ranking zP1y is perceived in problem xyz, while zI1wxyzy means that the
same strict ranking is not perceived in problem wxyz. In each problem A the choice set
C(A) is obtained by maximizing R1A followed lexicographically by R
2.
primary preference system R̂1i and secondary relation R̂2i can stand in for the
unobserved structures R1 and R2.20
An example of a choice function that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2.9
appears in Figure 1, in which each cell corresponds to a choice problem drawn
from wxyz. Here the first entry in a given cell shows which alternatives on the
menu are deemed choosable (e.g., C(wyz) = yz), the second shows the per-
ceived primary preference rankings (e.g., zI1wyzyP
1
wyzw), and the third shows
the relevant secondary rankings (e.g., wP2yI2z). It is easily verified in this case
that C = G(G(·,R1),R2), in accordance with our result.
Starting with the choice function in Figure 1, a violation of Weak Con-
gruence can be manufactured by changing the data point C(wxyz) = x to
C(wxyz) = y.21 To confirm the violation, observe that since y ∈ C(xy) we
have yR̂1dwxyx, and since x ∈ C(wxy) we then have both xR̂1dwxyzy and xR̂2dy.
But now, since xR̂1iwxyzy, xR̂
2iy, and y ∈ C(wxyz), Weak Congruence de-
mands that x ∈ C(wxyz), when in fact C(wxyz) = y. By Theorem 2.9 the
new (post-modification) choice function is thus inconsistent with our model.
2.5 Numerical representations
In this section we examine numerical representations of the cognitive model
characterized in Theorem 2.9 under the simplifying assumption that X is fi-
20 Furthermore, the revealed constructs are shown to have the required nestedness and
ordering properties, except that R̂2i need not be complete. This difficulty is overcome by
using Szpilrajn’s Theorem [34] to replace R̂2i with a complete preorder that generates the
same behavior when composed with R̂1i.
21 Base Transitivity of course continues to hold after this modification.
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nite.22 Clearly the operation G(·,R2) can then be represented by maximization
of a real-valued function, while G(·,R1) does not in general have this prop-
erty. Instead, the latter operation admits the following more elaborate type of
representation, which makes its satisficing interpretation apparent.
Definition 2.10. A. A threshold structure 〈f1, θ1〉 is a pair of functions f1 :
X → R and θ1 : D→ R such that ∀x, y ∈ X we have θ1(xy) = max f1[xy]. B.
A threshold structure 〈f1, θ1〉 is said to be expansive if ∀A,B ∈ D such that
A ⊆ B and max f1[A] ≥ θ1(B) we have θ1(A) ≥ θ1(B).
Here f1 represents the true primary relation R
1, while θ1 associates with
each menu A an f1-threshold θ1(A) for viability as a potential choice. The
alternatives that progress to the second stage are those whose primary utilities
fall on the interval between θ1(A) and max f1[A], which is another way to
describe the highest pseudo-indifference class of options according to P1A. The
θ1(xy) = max f1[xy] requirement then enforces our assumption that the agent
perceives his true primary preferences in binary choice problems.23
Nestedness of the perceived preference system R1 translates into the re-
quirement that the threshold representation be “expansive.”24 To understand
this property, let A ⊆ B and suppose (contrary to Definition 2.10B) that
max f1[A] ≥ θ1(B) > θ1(A). Selecting x ∈ A such that f1(x) = max f1[A] and
assuming without loss of generality that ∃y ∈ A with f1(y) = θ1(A), we then
have f1(x) ≥ θ1(B) > θ1(A) = f1(y). In this case the strict preference xP1y is
perceived in problem B but not in A ⊆ B, violating nestedness. The expan-
siveness property thus requires θ1 to be in a sense conditionally decreasing:
Larger menus must be assigned lower thresholds, but only if some option on
the smaller menu achieves the threshold for the larger one.25
We can now state a version of the characterization in Theorem 2.9 in which
the DM’s satisficing with respect to the primary criterion and subsequent
maximization of the secondary criterion appear explicitly.
Theorem 2.11. Let X be finite. Then there exist an expansive threshold struc-
ture 〈f1, θ1〉 and an f2 : X → R such that ∀A ∈ D we have
C(A) = arg max
x∈A∧ f1(x)≥θ1(A)
f2(x) (2)
22 Without the finiteness restriction, necessary and sufficient conditions for a binary rela-
tion to admit a utility representation are provided by Fishburn [12, p. 27]. The relationship
between threshold structures (see Definition 2.10) and relation systems can also be investi-
gated in the general case, but this essentially technical issue is not pursued here.
23 For example, the first-stage constructs R1 and R1 in Figure 1 admit representations
〈f1, θ1〉 such that f1(z) > f1(y) > f1(x) > f1(w); θ1(wx) = θ1(wxy) = θ1(wxyz) =
f1(x); θ1(wy) = θ1(xy) = θ1(wyz) = f1(y); and θ1(wz) = θ1(xz) = θ1(yz) = θ1(wxz) =
θ1(xyz) = f1(z).
24 This terminology originated in [35, p. 59], where the property was linked to the “Strong
Expansion” axiom on the choice function (see Sen [30, p. 66]).
25 Note that since θ1(A) equals the lowest f1-value in the highest pseudo-indifference class
of alternatives in A, we always have max f1[A] ≥ θ1(A) and at least one option survives the
first stage. Of course, there do exist threshold structures for which this inequality fails for
one or more menus, but these structures do not yield well-defined choice functions. (Recall
that we assume that C is nonempty-valued.)
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if and only if Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity hold.
Since the conditions on the choice function remain the same as in the ear-
lier result, this establishes (for the case of finite X) a three-way equivalence
between the cognitive model, the behavioral restrictions, and the numerical
representation in Equation 2.
3 Welfare analysis
3.1 Alternative conceptions of well-being
The problem of welfare analysis for boundedly rational and other nonstandard
models of decision making has been discussed at length in the literature. In
a detailed survey of the issue, Bernheim [5] contrasts three methodological
approaches, which identify welfare with “revealed well-being,” “measured well-
being,” or “choice.” Our model will be suited to the first of these approaches
once we have agreed which of its components is the indicator of well-being.26
However, there are at least two good candidates for this role.
1. The primary criterion.
Under some interpretations of the model, R1 will be the appropriate welfare
standard. In the case of positive action, for example, it is natural to suppose
that the employer’s well-being (e.g., profit) is determined entirely by the
employee’s merit, and that group identity is taken into account in the
second stage only because of legal or social pressure. Similarly, in the case
of salience effects we would normally assume that salience (the secondary
criterion) neither benefits nor harms the DM directly.
2. The lexicographic composition of the primary and secondary criteria.
In the case of surface characteristics, both R1 and R2 are relevant to well-
being. Welfare is therefore indicated by the composition of these two cri-
teria, which is the relation that the DM would maximize in the absence
of first-stage satisficing. This welfare order would also apply if we were
to posit that group identity directly benefits the employer (but cannot
substitute for higher merit), or that higher salience directly benefits the
DM.
Taking the second of these two candidates first, and recalling that R1 is
fully perceived in binary problems, we can define the lexicographic composition
of the primary and secondary criteria more precisely as follows.
Definition 3.1. Given a relation system R1 and a relation R2, let xL12y if




26 Specifically, our model is of the sort that Bernheim [5, p. 274] describes as “allowing
for divergences between preferences and behavior,” a strategy advocated by Rubinstein and
Salant [26, pp. 120–122].
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When our model holds we then have ∀x, y ∈ X that
G(xy,L12) = G(G(xy,R1xy),R
2) = G(G(xy,R1),R2) = C(xy), (3)
and thus xL12y ⇐⇒ x ∈ C(xy).27 It follows that the DM’s well-being is
revealed precisely by his behavior in binary problems.
Proposition 3.2. Given a nested, binary transitive system of complete pre-
orders R1 and a complete preorder R2, let C = G(G(·,R1),R2). Then ∀x, y ∈
X we have xL12y if and only if x ∈ C(xy).
We can therefore conclude that if L12 is the appropriate welfare order then
welfare analysis is straightforward under our model—at least provided binary
choice data are available.
Now suppose instead that the primary criterion R1 is the welfare stan-
dard. In this case by Equation 3 we have G(xy,R1xy) ⊇ C(xy) and thus x ∈
C(xy) =⇒ xR1xyy, but we lack the converse implication xR1xyy =⇒ x ∈ C(xy).
Of course, the latter assertion is equivalent to x /∈ C(xy) =⇒ yP1xyx. Hence
we know that revealed weak base preferences of the form x ∈ C(xy) are al-
ways genuine weak primary preferences, but we do not yet know when revealed
strict base preferences of the form C(xy) = x 6= y are genuine strict primary
preferences.
To address this question, observe first that C(xy) = x implies xR1xyy.
If in addition yR̂1dX x, then ∃A ∈ D such that x ∈ A and y ∈ C(A) =
G(G(A,R1),R2). From xR1xyy and the nestedness of R1 we have also xR1Ay,
so that x ∈ G(A,R1) and yR2x. And to ensure that y /∈ C(xy) we must then
have xP1xyy. This argument shows that any revealed strict base preference
standing in opposition to a R̂1dX -ranking is certain to be genuine.
Proposition 3.3. Given a nested, binary transitive system of complete pre-
orders R1 and a complete preorder R2, let C = G(G(·,R1),R2). Then ∀x, y ∈
X we have: A. x ∈ C(xy) only if xR1xyy. B. C(xy) = x 6= y and yR̂1dX x only
if xP1xyy.
If yR̂1dX x does not hold then ∀A ∈ D with x ∈ A we have y /∈ C(A), and
in particular y /∈ C(xy). This is the case in which the revealed strict base
preference C(xy) = x 6= y does not stand in opposition to a R̂1dX -ranking, and
so Proposition 3.3B does not apply. Indeed, the conclusion xP1xyy need not
hold in such situations.28 The issue here is that our two-stage model has extra
degrees of freedom relative to standard preference maximization: When y is
never chosen in the presence of x, we lack direct evidence to determine whether
this fact should be attributed to primary or secondary preference. As with
most generalizations of the standard model, we require violations of classical
rationality axioms (see, e.g., Footnote 19) to fully identify the components of
our theory.29
27 In Equation 3, the first equality comes from Definition 3.1, the second from Notation 2.3,
and the third from Theorem 2.9.
28 For example, if D = {x, y, xy} then C(xy) = x 6= y is consistent with xI1xyy and xP2y.
29 For example, if D = {x, y, z, xy, xz, yz, xyz} then R1 and R2 are both fully identified
by the choice data C(xy) = xy, C(xz) = x, C(yz) = y, and C(xyz) = z.
14 Christopher J. Tyson
3.2 Single-valued choice sets
Proposition 3.2 shows that binary choice data provide reliable welfare com-
parisons when L12 is the appropriate ranking, while Proposition 3.3 shows
that the same is true to a partial extent when R1 is the appropriate rank-
ing. To obtain a model in which L12 and R1 are identical, and hence binary
welfare comparisons are reliable in either case, it suffices to require that the
primary criterion be a complete order. This can be implemented by imposing
the following restriction on the preference system R1.
Definition 3.4. A relation system R is binary antisymmetric if ∀x, y ∈ X we
have xRxyyRxyx only if x = y.
The observable consequence of this restriction is that menus with two alter-
natives will have choice sets with only one.
Condition 3.5 (Base Univalence). For each x, y ∈ X we have |C(xy)| = 1.
Proposition 3.6. There exist a nested, binary transitive, binary antisymmet-
ric system of complete preorders R1 and a complete preorder R2 such that
C = G(G(·,R1),R2) if and only if Weak Congruence, Base Transitivity, and
Base Univalence hold.
Propositions 3.2–3.3 can then be merged and strengthened into the following
result.
Proposition 3.7. Given a nested, binary transitive, binary antisymmetric
system of complete preorders R1 and a complete preorder R2, suppose that
C = G(G(·,R1),R2). Then ∀x, y ∈ X we have x ∈ C(xy) ⇐⇒ xL12y ⇐⇒
xR1xyy.
Incidentally, for some purposes we may wish to require that C is globally
single-valued; for example, to relate the theory to other models that generate
unique choices.
Condition 3.8 (Univalence). For each A ∈ D we have |C(A)| = 1.
This has the incremental effect of imposing the complete order requirement
also on the secondary relation.30
Theorem 3.9. There exist a nested, binary transitive, binary antisymmet-
ric system of complete preorders R1 and a complete order R2 such that C =
G(G(·,R1),R2) if and only if Weak Congruence, Base Transitivity, and Uni-
valence hold.
30 Hence adding Univalence to the axioms in Theorem 2.9 does not reduce our model to
standard preference maximization, as occurs under satisficing without a secondary criterion
(see [35, pp. 61–62]).
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3.3 The primacy of binary problems
To summarize, the message of Section 3 is that welfare analysis is quite
tractable under our model if either R1 or L12 is the appropriate welfare or-
der. Conflicts between classical revealed preferences are resolved by favoring
data from smaller menus in which—according to the model—the true, welfare-
significant preferences are perceived with higher resolution. This leads us to
take binary choices as the most reliable arbiter of well-being.
Our approach to “behavioral welfare economics” is in fact anticipated in
Bernheim’s survey [5, p. 299], which offers the following illustration of the
methodology proposed by Bernheim and Rangel [6].
For example, if it is known that an individual with well-behaved preferences some-
times “satisfices” when confronted with more than two alternatives, we would re-
strict [the welfare-relevant domain] to binary choice sets [i.e., menus], and thereby
generate a welfare criterion that accurately reflects his well-being.
The same approach is valid in the context of Manzini and Mariotti’s [15,
p. 1160] model of choice with categorization, in which “[w]henever there is
conflict between choice from a binary set and choice from a larger set, the
choice from the binary set is driven by preference[.]” Indeed, binary choices can
be used to infer welfare rankings in any setting where removing other options




This paper belongs to a substantial literature that studies the behavioral im-
plications of nonstandard models of decision making. Without attempting a
comprehensive survey, we now highlight some areas of related work.
Several recent papers introduce into choice theory versions of the “con-
sideration set.” Recall that this is the subset of available alternatives that is
actively investigated by the DM, a concept discussed extensively in the market-
ing literature.32 Writing σ(A) for the consideration set associated with menu
A and R2 for the preference relation, such models assume that
C(A) = G(σ(A),R2). (4)
31 Note that this commonality of welfare rankings under different models allows a partial
escape from the problem of “observational equivalence” emphasized by Bernheim [5, p. 279].
32 See, e.g., Roberts and Lattin [24]. Versions of this idea have been incorporated into
economic models by, among others, Eliaz and Spiegler [11], who examine the strategic in-
teraction among firms that try to manipulate the consideration sets of their customers with
“door opener” products and other costly marketing schemes; and by Armstrong et al. [2],
who analyze a search model in which one seller is more “prominent” than its rivals and is
therefore sampled first by potential buyers.
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The empirical content of the theory is determined by the restrictions imposed
on the map σ : D→ F and the relation R2, as in the following special cases.
1. Masatlioglu et al. [18] require that ∀A,B ∈ D such that σ(B) ⊆ A ⊆ B we
have σ(A) = σ(B), in which case σ is designated an “attention filter.” In
addition, they require that R2 is a complete order.
2. Lleras et al. [13] impose the “consideration filter” assumption that ∀A,B ∈
D with A ⊆ B we have σ(B) ∩ A ⊆ σ(A), and assume also that R2 is a
complete order. The same structure describes Cherepanov et al.’s [9] “order
rationalization theory.”
3. In Manzini and Mariotti’s [14] model of “rational shortlist methods,” R2
is a tournament and there exists a complete relation R1 such that σ =
G(·,R1).
4. Spears [33] requires that σ be a consideration filter and R2 a tournament.
This also describes Cherepanov et al.’s [9] notion of “basic rationalization”
and Manzini and Mariotti’s [15, p. 1160] “categorize-then-choose” theory.
It is apparent from the descriptions of these models that Cases 2 and 3 each
separately imply Case 4, since any complete order is a tournament and for any
R1 the map G(·,R1) is a consideration filter. Cases 2 and 3 are independent
of each other, however, and Case 1 is independent of all the others.33
Taking σ = G(·,R1), our model is also an instance of the consideration-set
framework in Equation 4. Our hypothesis that R2 is a complete preorder is
weaker than the complete-order assumption and independent of the tourna-
ment assumption (since transitivity and antisymmetry are themselves indepen-
dent). Moreover, for a relation system R1 possessing the properties specified
in our model, the hypothesis that σ = G(·,R1) is independent of both the
attention filter and consideration filter assumptions, as well as independent of
the structure imposed on the map σ in Case 3 (where R1 need not be transi-
tive). In short, our theory of satisficing behavior with a secondary criterion is
structurally unrelated to all of the above consideration-set models.34
Depending on the interpretation of our framework, it may or may not bear
conceptual similarities to the theories cited above. On the one hand, the idea
of surface characteristics resembles Manzini and Mariotti’s [14] motivation for
“sequential rationalizability” (see Footnote 6). The substantive difference be-
tween these two models lies in how the DM’s bounded rationality is manifested
in the lexicographic setting—whether by relaxing transitivity of R1 in the case
of rational shortlist methods, or by moving to a nested preference system R1
in the case of our theory.
33 Note that all of the contributions cited in Cases 1–4 impose Univalence (Condition 3.8)
as a background assumption, and all except for [15] assume that D = F.
34 Indeed, it is shown in [35] that the consideration-filter property is precisely the feature
of classical choice behavior that must be abandoned to allow for satisficing (as modeled in
Section 2.2). Observe also that the independence of our theory from those in Cases 1–4 at
the level of the cognitive model has its counterpart at the axiomatic level. For example,
Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity together do not imply either of the “Weak WARP”
and “Expansion” conditions used in Cases 3–4 (see [14, p. 1828]). And conversely, Weak
Congruence is itself not implied by any of the other consideration-set structures.
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On the other hand, if we interpret our model as one of salience effects, then
conceptually there are clear distinctions from the above consideration-set the-
ories. In Masatlioglu et al. [18] and Lleras et al. [13], for example, the options
in σ(A) are preselected from menu A by some cognitive mechanism (respec-
tively, awareness and consideration), after which the DM applies a standard
preference relation R2. Contrastingly, in our model R2 encodes comparative
salience, while the preference relation R1 used in the first stage is coarsened by
satisficing into the nested relation system R1. Furthermore, these differences
will persist when the theories are adapted for applied work: Whereas the struc-
tures in [18] and [13] are well-designed for modeling informative advertising,
which (among other goals) seeks to bring alternatives into the consideration
set, our model could be used to create a role for non-informative advertising
that seeks to affect the relative salience of options between which a satisficing
agent is pseudo-indifferent.35
In [36], the author provides an abstract theory of two-stage choice proce-
dures that is general enough to encompass versions of the Lleras et al. [13]
consideration-filter model and the Manzini and Mariotti [14] rational-shortlist
model, as well as a weaker version of our model. This theory proceeds by formu-
lating a generalization of the Weak Congruence condition that can characterize
any procedure with a certain lattice structure. The abstract analysis adds little
of value to the present paper, telling us only that removing Base Transitivity
from the axioms in Theorem 2.9 is equivalent to relaxing binary transitivity
of R1. In particular, it yields nothing resembling the numerical representation
in Equation 2, for which Base Transitivity is essential. However, [36] does il-
lustrate that multi-stage models of choice can share mathematical structure
that allows us to transfer techniques between seemingly distinct frameworks.
In contrast, Manzini et al. [17] focus on the numerical representation, ax-
iomatizing the existence of functions f1, f2 : X → R and θ1 : D → R such
that Equation 2 holds. Since they impose neither expansiveness of the thresh-
old structure 〈f1, θ1〉 nor the requirement (part of Definition 2.10A) that each
θ1(xy) = max f1[xy], this is weaker than the model characterized in Theo-
rem 2.9. In fact, Manzini et al. show that it is much weaker, to the extent that
Equation 2 is completely vacuous for choice functions satisfying Univalence.
Since our theory significantly constrains choice behavior with or without Uni-
valence, this implies that most of the logical strength of our axioms is captured
not by Equation 2 itself, but rather by the additional restrictions we impose.36
35 For instance, a “Coca-Cola!” billboard is unlikely to bring the ubiquitous carbonated
drink into the consideration sets of many consumers previously unaware of its existence. The
billboard might, however, make Coke an especially salient product for those consumers who
have no perceivable preference between various brands of cola which both taste and cost
very much the same. Non-informative advertising is by no means rare: Resnik and Stern [22]
review 378 commercials broadcast on American network television in the year 1975, and
conclude that “less than half of the sample’s advertisements met the liberal criteri[on] of
possessing [any] useful informational cues.” (For a survey of economic justifications for non-
informative, or “persuasive” advertising, see Bagwell [4].)
36 It is straightforward to show that the axiom used by Manzini et al. [17] is implied by
the conjunction of Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity.
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4.2 Models with framing effects
A second area of related research studies the impact of “frames” on decision
making. In the broadest sense, a frame is any aspect of a choice problem
other than the available alternatives and their payoff-relevant characteristics
that may affect the DM’s behavior. Examples include the order in which the
options are presented and the moment in time when the choice is made.37
Salant and Rubinstein [27] allow for framing effects by conditioning the
choice function on the new, payoff-irrelevant information. Denoting the set
of frames by F , the choice set associated with menu A in f ∈ F is written
c(A, f), and C(A) =
⋃
f∈F c(A, f) then contains the alternatives that are
choosable from A in at least one frame. Assuming for simplicity that each
|c(A, f)| = 1, the authors investigate the relationship between the “extended
choice function” c : D × F → F and the induced C : D → F. In particular,
they show when C will satisfy classical rationality axioms.
If we interpret our model in terms of salience effects or in terms of positive
action, then the payoff-irrelevant information affecting behavior is contained
in the secondary relation R2. Writing F for the set of all complete orders on
X and taking some R2 ∈ F , Equation 1 can be rephrased as c(A,R2) =
G(G(A,R1),R2). Moreover, since here C(A) =
⋃
R2∈F G(G(A,R1),R2) =
G(A,R1), the models of satisficing behavior with and without a secondary
criterion are linked in Salant and Rubinstein’s formulation.
Extended choice functions could also be used to give our theory additional
structure. Suppose, for example, that ρ ∈ F ⊆ R measures the cognitive
resources available to the DM. This endowment will affect his perceived pri-
mary preference system, now written R1(ρ), yielding conditional choice sets
c(A, ρ) = G(G(A,R1(ρ)),R2). The rationale for nestedness (see Section 2.2)
will then apply not only to changes in the menu but also to changes in the
resource allocation: Given x, y ∈ A ∈ D and ρ1, ρ2 ∈ F such that ρ1 ≤ ρ2, we
should have xP1A(ρ1)y only if xP
1
A(ρ2)y. This extended nestedness assumption
opens the door to revealed-preference deductions across different values of ρ,
and to comparative statics with respect to the resource endowment.
One example of framing offered by Salant and Rubinstein [27, p. 1289] is
a satisficing procedure in the context of choice from lists.38 Here once again
F is the set of all complete orders on X, and R2 ∈ F has the interpretation
that xR2y whenever x is no later than y in the list order. The DM has utility
function f1 : X → R and “aspiration threshold” θ̄ ∈ R, which we can think
of as a constant map θ1 : D → R. Given a menu A, if any available alterna-
tive achieves the utility threshold then the DM chooses the first such option
(according to the list order), and otherwise he chooses the last available alter-
37 An important branch of the literature on framing seeks to model status-quo or other
reference-point effects. Among numerous other contributions in this area, Bossert and Spru-
mont [7] propose a theory in which the status-quo alternative is “exogenous” (i.e., objective),
while Ok et al. [19] consider the “endogenous” (i.e., subjective) case.
38 See also Rubinstein and Salant [25, p. 5]. Papi [20] studies a related but considerably
more flexible model of satisficing in which alternatives need not be examined one at a time.
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native regardless of its utility. Taking any representation f2 : X → R of the
list order R2, this means that the DM will solve the constrained optimization
problem in Equation 2 when facing any menu A such that max f1[A] ≥ θ̄. At
least over the latter subdomain of choice problems, the list order here plays
the same role as salience or group identity in our theory. But of course in our
model the map θ1 need not be constant, and the thresholds assigned to menus
are by construction always achievable.
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A Appendix
Given a binary relation R on X, its transitive closure R∗ is defined by xR∗y if and only
if ∃n ≥ 2 and z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that x = z1Rz2R · · ·Rzn = y. Furthermore, R has
symmetric part R• defined by xR•y if and only if xRyRx, and asymmetric part R◦ defined
by xR◦y if and only if both xRy and ¬[yRx].
A relation is a strict partial order if it is irreflexive (xRy only if x 6= y) and transitive; a
linear order if it is irreflexive, transitive, and weakly complete (x 6= y only if xRy or yRx);
and an equivalence if it is reflexive (x = y only if xRy), symmetric (xRy only if yRx), and
transitive. An equivalence Q is a congruence with respect to R whenever we have wQxRyQz
only if wRz.
The following fact about binary relations is adapted from Richter [23, pp. 639–640].
Lemma A.1. Any reflexive relation R admits a complete preorder Q ⊇ R∗ such that xQy
only if xR∗y or ¬[yR∗x].
Proof. Since R is reflexive, [R∗]• is a congruence with respect to the strict partial order
[R∗]◦. Write φ(x) for the [R∗]•-equivalence class containing x ∈ X, and define a strict
partial order  on Φ = {φ(x) : x ∈ X} by φ(x)  φ(y) if and only if x[R∗]◦y. Szpilrajn’s
Theorem [34] then allows us to embed  in a linear order ≫ on Φ, and we can proceed to
define a complete preorder Q by xQy if and only if ¬[φ(y) ≫ φ(x)]. It follows that xR∗y
only if either φ(x)  φ(y) or φ(x) = φ(y). But then φ(x) ≫ φ(y) or φ(x) = φ(y), and
in either case we have ¬[φ(y) ≫ φ(x)] and xQy. Hence R∗ ⊆ Q. Moreover, if xQy then
¬[φ(y) φ(x)] and hence ¬[y[R∗]◦x], which means that xR∗y or ¬[yR∗x].
Lemma A.2. A. R̂1d is a nested system of complete relations, and R̂1i is a nested system
of complete preorders. B. C ⊆ G(·, R̂1i). C. If C ⊆ G(·,R1) for some nested system of
complete preorders R1, then R̂1i ⊆ R1.
Proof. A. The nestedness of R̂1d is immediate. Also, given x, y ∈ A ∈ D we have both
A ⊇ xy ∈ D and C(xy) 6= ∅, and therefore R̂1dA is complete. The nestedness of R̂
1i and
completeness of R̂1iA follow, respectively, from the nestedness of R̂
1d and completeness of
R̂1dA . Moreover, R̂
1i
A is transitive by construction and is thus a complete preorder.
B. Given x ∈ A ∈ D, let x /∈ G(A, R̂1i). Then ∃y ∈ A such that ¬[xR̂1iAy], so ¬[xR̂
1d
A y]
and x /∈ C(A).
C. Let C ⊆ G(·,R1) for some nested system of complete preordersR1. Given x, y ∈ B ∈
D, the assertion yR̂1dB x means that ∃A ∈ D such that x ∈ A ⊆ B and y ∈ C(A) ⊆ G(A,R
1).
We then have yR1Ax and hence yR
1
Bx since R
1 is nested. Thus R̂1d ⊆ R1, and it follows
that R̂1i = [R̂1d]∗ ⊆ [R1]∗ ⊆ R1 since R1 is a system of transitive relations.
Definition A.3. For x, y ∈ X: A. Let xR̂by if x ∈ C(xy). B. Let xP̂by if y /∈ C(xy).
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Lemma A.4. A. Base Transitivity implies that R̂1i is binary transitive. B. Base Univa-
lence implies that R̂1i is binary antisymmetric.
Proof. A. Given x, y, z ∈ X, if xR̂1ixyyR̂1iyzz then xR̂1dxyyR̂1dyzz and therefore xR̂byR̂bz. But
then xR̂bz by Base Transitivity, in which case xR̂1dxzz and xR̂
1i
xzz.
B. Given x, y ∈ X, if xR̂1ixyyR̂1ixyx then xR̂1dxyyR̂1dxyx and therefore xR̂byR̂bx. But then
x, y ∈ C(xy), and so x = y by Base Univalence.
Definition A.5. Define the binary relation Q̂2d as follows. For x, y ∈ X, let xQ̂2dy if
∀A ∈ D such that xR̂1iAy and y ∈ C(A) we have x ∈ C(A).
Lemma A.6. A. R̂2d is reflexive. B. C ⊆ G(G(·, R̂1i), R̂2i). C. If C ⊆ G(G(·,R1),R2)
for some nested system of complete preorders R1 and complete preorder R2, then R̂2i ⊆ R2.
D. If C = G(G(·,R1),R2) for some nested system of complete preorders R1 and complete
preorder R2, then R2 ⊆ Q̂2d.
Proof. A. Given x ∈ X, we have {x} ∈ D and C(x) = x, so xR̂2dx and R̂2d is reflexive.
B. Given x ∈ A ∈ D, let x /∈ G(G(A, R̂1i), R̂2i). If x /∈ G(A, R̂1i), then x /∈ C(A) by
Lemma A.2B. If x ∈ G(A, R̂1i) then ∃y ∈ G(A, R̂1i) such that ¬[xR̂2iy], and so ¬[xR̂2dy].
Since yR̂1iAx, this implies once again that x /∈ C(A).
C. Let C ⊆ G(G(·,R1),R2) for some nested system of complete preorders R1 and
complete preorder R2. Given x, y ∈ X, the assertion yR̂2dx means that ∃A ∈ D such that
xR̂1iAy and y ∈ C(A) ⊆ G(G(A,R
1),R2). We then have xR1Ay by Lemma A.2C. Moreover,
since y ∈ G(A,R1) and R1 is a system of complete preorders, we have x ∈ G(A,R1) and it
follows that yR2x. Thus R̂2d ⊆ R2, and so we can conclude that R̂2i = [R̂2d]∗ ⊆ [R2]∗ ⊆ R2
since R2 is transitive.
D. Let C = G(G(·,R1),R2) for some nested system of complete preorders R1 and
complete preorder R2. Given x, y ∈ X, the assertion ¬[yQ̂2dx] means that ∃A ∈ D such
that yR̂1iAx and x ∈ C(A) = G(G(A,R
1),R2) 63 y. We then have yR1Ax by Lemma A.2C.
Moreover, since x ∈ G(A,R1) and R1 is a system of complete preorders, it follows that
y ∈ G(A,R1) and hence ¬[yR2x] since R2 is a complete preorder. But then R2 ⊆ Q̂2d by
contraposition.
Proof of Theorem 2.9. Let Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity hold and suppose for
some x ∈ A ∈ D that x /∈ C(A). Then ∃y ∈ C(A), and we have y ∈ G(G(A, R̂1i), R̂2i)
by Lemma A.6B. If x ∈ G(A, R̂1i) then yR̂2ix, and since xR̂1iAy we have also ¬[xQ̂
2dy]. In
this case ¬[xR̂2iy] by Weak Congruence (which is equivalent to R̂2i ⊆ Q̂2d). Defining S2 by
wS2z ⇐⇒ [wR̂2iz ∨¬[zR̂2iw]], it follows that ¬[xS2y] and hence x /∈ G(G(A, R̂1i),S2). But
then G(G(·, R̂1i), S2) ⊆ C by contraposition. Moreover, R̂2d is reflexive by Lemma A.6A,
and so by Lemma A.1 there exists a complete preorder T2 ⊇ R̂2i with T2 ⊆ S2. We then have
that C ⊆ G(G(·, R̂1i), R̂2i) ⊆ G(G(·, R̂1i),T2) ⊆ G(G(·, R̂1i), S2) ⊆ C, using Lemma A.6B,
and hence C = G(G(·, R̂1i),T2). Finally, by Lemmas A.2A and A.4A we have that R̂1i is a
nested, binary transitive system of complete preorders.
Conversely, suppose that there exist a nested, binary transitive system of complete
preorders R1 and a complete preorder R2 such that C = G(G(·,R1),R2). We then have
R̂2i ⊆ R2 ⊆ Q̂2d by Lemma A.6C–D, which implies Weak Congruence (i.e., R̂2i ⊆ Q̂2d).
Moreover, given x, y, z ∈ X, if xR̂byR̂bz then xR1xyyR1yzz since C ⊆ G(·,R1), and hence
xR1xzz since R1 is binary transitive. Since C ⊆ G(G(·,R1),R2) we have xI1xyy =⇒ xR2y,
and similarly yI1yzz =⇒ yR2z. It follows that xI1xzz =⇒ xR2yR2z =⇒ xR2z since R2 is
transitive. But then xR̂bz since G(G(·,R1),R2) ⊆ C, and so Base Transitivity holds.
Proof of Theorem 2.11. Let Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity hold, so that by The-
orem 2.9 there exist a nested, binary transitive system of complete preorders R1 and a
complete preorder R2 such that C = G(G(·,R1),R2). Since R2 is a complete preorder (and
X is finite) it admits a representation f2 : X → R. Moreover, by Base Transitivity we
have that R̂b is a complete preorder and so it too admits a representation f1 : X → R.
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Define θ1 : D → R by setting each θ1(A) = min f1[G(A,R1)], with the implication that
G(A,R1) ⊆ {z ∈ A : f1(z) ≥ θ1(A)}. Now, given any z ∈ A ∈ D for which z /∈ G(A,R1),
select any y ∈ G(A,R1) such that f1(y) = min f1[G(A,R1)]. We then have yP1Az since
R1A is a complete preorder, yP
1
yzz since R1 is nested, and z /∈ G(G(yz,R1),R2) = C(yz).
It follows that yP̂bz, and therefore f1(z) < f1(y) = θ1(A) since f1 represents R̂b. Hence,
by contraposition, we have {z ∈ A : f1(z) ≥ θ1(A)} ⊆ G(A,R1), and so we can con-
clude that G(A,R1) = {z ∈ A : f1(z) ≥ θ1(A)}. But then Equation 2 holds for each
A ∈ D, as desired. To confirm that 〈f1, θ1〉 is a valid threshold structure, take any x, y ∈ X
such that f1(x) ≥ f1(y), in which case f1(x) ≥ θ1(xy). If f1(x) > θ1(xy) = f1(y), then
xP̂by since f1 represents R̂b, y /∈ C(xy), and thus f1(y) < θ1(xy), a contradiction. Hence
θ1(xy) = f1(x) = max f1[xy], as desired. Finally, to confirm that 〈f1, θ1〉 is expansive, let
A,B ∈ D be such that A ⊆ B and max f1[A] ≥ θ1(B). Then ∃y ∈ A ⊆ B such that
f1(y) ≥ θ1(B), and so y ∈ {z ∈ B : f1(z) ≥ θ1(B)} = G(B,R1). For any x ∈ G(A,R1)
we have xR1Ay and so xR
1
By since R
1 is nested. Since y ∈ G(B,R1) and R1B is a complete
preorder, this implies that x ∈ G(B,R1). But then G(A,R1) ⊆ G(B,R1) and therefore
θ1(A) = min f1[G(A,R1)] ≥ min f1[G(B,R1)] = θ1(B), as desired.
Conversely, suppose that there exist an expansive threshold structure 〈f1, θ1〉 and an
f2 : X → R such that Equation 2 holds for each A ∈ D. Define a relation system R1 as
follows: For each A ∈ D, let xR1Ay if and only if ∀B ∈ D with B ⊇ A and f1(y) ≥ θ1(B)
we have f1(x) ≥ θ1(B). By construction R1 is then nested and each R1A is complete, and
clearly ∀A ∈ D we have G(A,R1) ⊆ {z ∈ A : f1(z) ≥ θ1(A)}. Now, given x, y, z ∈ A ∈ D
such that xR1AyR
1
Az, for any B ∈ D with B ⊇ A and f1(z) ≥ θ1(B) we have f1(y) ≥ θ1(B)
since yR1Az, and in turn f1(x) ≥ θ1(B) since xR
1
Ay. It follows that xR
1
Az, so we have that
R1A is transitive and R
1 is a system of complete preorders. Furthermore, given x ∈ A ∈ D
such that x /∈ G(A,R1), there exists a y ∈ A such that yP1Ax. It follows that ∃B ∈ D
such that B ⊇ A and f1(y) ≥ θ1(B) > f1(x), and since 〈f1, θ1〉 is expansive we have that
θ1(A) ≥ θ1(B) > f1(x) and x /∈ {z ∈ A : f1(z) ≥ θ1(A)}. But then by contraposition we
have {z ∈ A : f1(z) ≥ θ1(A)} ⊆ G(A,R1) and thus G(A,R1) = {z ∈ A : f1(z) ≥ θ1(A)}.
To confirm that R1 is binary transitive, let x, y, z ∈ X be such that xR1xyyR1yzz. We then
have f1(y) ≥ θ1(xy) =⇒ f1(x) ≥ θ1(xy) and similarly f1(z) ≥ θ1(yz) =⇒ f1(y) ≥ θ1(yz).
Since also θ1(xy) = max f1[xy] and similarly θ1(yz) = max f1[yz], we can conclude that
f1(x) ≥ f1(y) ≥ f1(z) and hence xR1xzz, as desired. Finally, denoting by R2 the complete
preorder represented by f2, we have that C = G(G(·,R1),R2) and so Weak Congruence
and Base Transitivity hold by Theorem 2.9.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. If Weak Congruence, Base Transitivity, and Base Univalence hold,
then R̂1i is a nested, binary transitive, binary antisymmetric system of complete preorders
by Lemmas A.2A and A.4. Moreover, it can be shown (see the above proof of Theorem 2.9)
that there exists a complete preorder T2 such that C = G(G(·, R̂1i),T2).
Conversely, if there exist a nested, binary transitive, binary antisymmetric system of
complete preorders R1 and a complete preorder R2 such that C = G(G(·,R1),R2), then
Weak Congruence and Base Transitivity follow from Theorem 2.9 and Base Univalence
follows from C ⊆ G(·,R1) and the binary antisymmetry of R1.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Suppose that C = G(G(·,R1),R2) for some nested, binary tran-
sitive, binary antisymmetric system of complete preorders R1 and complete preorder R2.
For x, y ∈ X we then have xL12y ⇐⇒ x ∈ C(xy) =⇒ xR1xyy by Propositions 3.2 and 3.3A.
Moreover, if xR1xyy then since R1 is binary antisymmetric we have xP1xyy or x = y, and in
either case it follows that x ∈ C(xy).
Proof of Theorem 3.9. If Weak Congruence, Base Transitivity, and Univalence hold, then
R̂1i is a nested, binary transitive, binary antisymmetric system of complete preorders by
Lemmas A.2A and A.4. Define a relation S2 by wS2z ⇐⇒ wR̂2dz 6= w. If ∃x ∈ X with
x[S2]∗x, then clearly ∃y ∈ X such that xS2y[S2]∗x 6= y. Hence xR̂2dyR̂2ix, and it follows
that ∃A ∈ D with yR̂1iAx and x ∈ C(A). But then y ∈ C(A) by Weak Congruence and so
y = x by Univalence, a contradiction. This establishes that [S2]∗ is irreflexive and hence
a strict partial order. Szpilrajn’s Theorem [34] allows us to embed [S2]∗ in a linear order,
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which can be reflexivized to yield a complete order T2 ⊇ [S2]∗ ⊇ R̂2i. Using Lemma A.6B,
it follows that C ⊆ G(G(·, R̂1i), R̂2i) ⊆ G(G(·, R̂1i),T2). Now, take any x ∈ A ∈ D with
x /∈ C(A). Using Lemma A.2B, we know that ∃y ∈ C(A) ⊆ G(A, R̂1i) such that y 6= x.
If x ∈ G(A, R̂1i) then xR̂1iAy and hence yR̂
2dx. But then yT2x, whereupon ¬[xT2y] since
x 6= y and T2 is a complete order. It follows that x /∈ G(G(A, R̂1i),T2), and thus we can
conclude that G(G(·, R̂1i),T2) ⊆ C by contraposition. Hence C = G(G(·, R̂1i),T2).
Conversely, if there exist a nested, binary transitive, binary antisymmetric system of
complete preorders R1 and a complete order R2 such that C = G(G(·,R1),R2), then Weak
Congruence and Base Transitivity follow from Theorem 2.9 and Univalence follows from
C ⊆ G(G(·,R1),R2) and the antisymmetry of R2.
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